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James Seth on Natural Law and Legal Theory 
Thom Brooks
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Abstract. This article argues that James Seth provides illuminating contributions to our 
understanding of law and, more specifically, the natural law tradition. Seth defends a unique 
perspective through his emphasis on personalism that helps identify a distinctive and 
compelling account of natural law and legal moralism. The next section surveys standard 
positions in the natural law tradition. This is followed with an examination of Seth’s 
approach and the article concludes with analysis of its wider importance for scholars of 
Seth’s work as well as legal philosophers more generally. 
Introduction 
James Seth (1860-1925) has become an obscure figure in the literature about British Idealism. 
Virtually nothing has been published offering any substantive examination of his thought.
2
 
This has remained unchanged despite renewed interest in British Idealism in recent years. It 
is all the more surprising when we consider that Seth was a major figure during his lifetime. 
For example, he held prestigious posts at several universities: Seth was Professor of 
Metaphysics and Ethics at Dalhousie College (later honorary President of the Canadian 
Club), Professor of Philosophy and Elton Professor of Natural Theology at Brown University, 
Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cornell University and for nearly thirty years Seth held the 
Chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh University (Pringle-Pattison 1926: xix-xxv). Seth 
also served as editor of the Philosophical Review, a flagship journal then as now. This gave 
him a unique international presence through his achievements in securing major positions at 
leading departments with an enviable career few might enjoy even today. Obituaries declared 
him ‘a man in a million’ and one of ‘the great Scottish prophets’ (Pringle-Pattison 1926: 
xxxii, Mabbott 1986: 73). John Muirhead noted that during Seth’s time in Edinburgh he 
‘made a place for himself in the life of the university and the city that would bear comparison 
with the most distinguished in the long line of his predecessors’ (Pringle-Pattison 1926: 
xxxiv). Yet this distinctive presence has failed thus far to translate into lasting philosophical 
importance. Seth’s relative obscurity is compounded further by the general neglect of British 
Idealism by legal philosophers. Law may not occupy a central place in the British Idealist 
literature, but it has received some attention on topics such as punishment and social policy. 
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 James Seth’s work receives only limited attention, for example, in William Mander’s magisterial British 
Idealism: A History (2011) and no substantive coverage in all comprehensive surveys of British Idealism 
(Boucher 1997, Boucher and Vincent 2000, Nicholson 1990, Tyler 2006, Vincent and Plant 1984). Bengtsson 
(2009) and Brooks (2012) offer rare more lengthy treatments although there is no one stand-alone piece 
dedicated to Seth’s work. Westlaw lists Brooks (2011a) and a reply to this piece by Brudner (2011) as the only 
articles in law journals or reviews mentioning Seth’s name. The Web of Science contains no work referring to 
Seth’s contributions. JSTOR lists several important reviews of books by Seth, but the only substantive 
discussions not already mentioned are Atkinson (1957) and Raphael (1955) where both primarily debate Seth’s 
reading of Mill’s Utilitarianism instead of Seth’s original work. 
What contributions to legal philosophy does Seth offer and why should these receive renewed 
attention now? 
This article argues that James Seth provides illuminating contributions to our understanding 
of law and, more specifically, the natural law tradition. Seth defends a unique perspective 
through his emphasis on individual rights that helps identify a distinctive and more 
compelling account of natural law and legal moralism.
3
 The next section surveys standard 
positions in the natural law tradition. This is followed with an examination of Seth’s 
approach and the article concludes with an analysis of its wider importance for scholars of 
Seth’s work as well as legal philosophers more generally. 
A Critical Survey of the Natural Law Tradition 
The natural law tradition is diverse and encompasses a wide range of ideas united about the 
view that law and morality are inextricably linked (Freeman 1994: 79-130). Illegality is often 
best understood as some form of immorality although how this is defended differs from one 
proponent to the next. James Seth offers a distinctive account about law within the natural 
law tradition. I will briefly survey leading theories about natural law in this section so we 
might better appreciate the novelty and potential future promise of Seth’s theory in the 
following section. 
The best starting place is the classical natural law theory presented by the Roman Stoics. In 
De Re Publica, Cicero argues: 
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, 
unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from 
wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions 
upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try 
to alter this law, nor is it allowable to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to 
abolish it entirely . . . there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or 
different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be 
valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, 
over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. 
Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by 
reasons of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is 
commonly considered punishments (Bix 1996: 224). 
This passage reveals several key elements of classical natural law. There is the distinction 
between ‘law’ and ‘true law’. Not all laws share equal standing because some are more ‘true’, 
or rather more ‘just’, than others. Laws that are inconsistent with morality are not merely 
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 My argument is that Seth offers ‘a distinctive and more compelling account of natural law and legal 
moralism’. I will demonstrate why I believe his account may overcome various problems better than other 
such accounts. This is not to say that its work is done. Much more space is required to set out the larger case 
for whether Seth’s account is not only better on certain problems than other natural law accounts, but 
whether it is better than other views in jurisprudence. This is a project beyond the scope of this article where, 
in effect, my goal is to draw greater attention to Seth’s views on law and legal theory to overcome its 
widespread neglect. 
corrupt, but not truly law, properly speaking (Brooks 2012b: 168). The more that law is 
consistent with morality, the more ‘true’ or ‘just’ it becomes. Crucial is which view about 
morality we use as our standard for the assessment of the justice of law. This is 
unsurprisingly a matter of some controversy among natural lawyers past and present that I 
will not address here. Nonetheless, the use of morality to inform our assessment about law is 
an idea that has had deep attraction from the time of Cicero through to today.  
The moral standard we use to assess the justice of law is universal, timeless and God is its 
author. The idea rests on an assumption that moral standards are not subject to change over 
time in response to new conditions or different contexts. It also assumes that morality is 
divinely sanctioned. This view has been revised in modern conceptions of natural law. I will 
draw upon the examples of Kant, Finnis and Fuller. 
Immanuel Kant accepts something like this view in arguing for law’s consistency with his 
idea of ‘the moral law’ developed through his categorical imperative (1996: 9-11, 15-20). His 
emphasis on the requirement for morality as involving consistency has led famously to 
charges by Hegel and others that Kant’s moral law is nothing more than an ‘empty 
formalism’ (see Brooks 2013, Freyenhagen 2012, Stern 2012). One difference between the 
ideas about natural law defended by Cicero and Kant is that only Kant argues that we may 
grasp natural law through reason and without any direct reference to God. Natural law’s 
authority may be secured through the use of reason. A second difference is that, for Kant, law 
should be consistent with morality, but not vice versa. This distinction between (legal) right 
and (moral) virtue is important: while all just laws should conform to the moral law, the 
moral law need not and should not be fully incorporated into positive law. Kant argues that 
individuals have some moral duties that should not be enforced by law, such as in areas of 
conscience (1996: 147-48. This is not because these duties are unimportant, but rather they 
may be unenforceable. 
John Finnis offers a further revision of natural law. He argues that there are seven basic forms 
of the human good, including knowledge, play and sociability (Finnis 1980: 85-90). Each is 
discoverable through the use of practical reflection on considering the basic forms of the 
good we might possess. In so doing, ‘they lay down for us the outlines of everyone one could 
reasonably want to do, to have, and to be’ (1980: 97). We determine these basic forms of the 
good first and then apply them to our assessment of law and legal systems. Finnis’s views are 
controversial, in part, for endorsing a view about the human good that is too wide.
4
  
Lon Fuller identifies principles that form what he calls ‘the inner morality of law’ (1969: 42). 
These are eight principles any legal system should satisfy (Fuller 1969: 39-49). These 
principles include our ensuring to ‘make the law known’ and ‘make it coherent and clear’ 
(1969: 42). Fuller argues that a ‘total failure in any one of these eight directions does not 
simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly called a legal 
system at all’ (1969: 39). So the idea is that some legal systems are more ‘lawful’ than others 
                                                          
4
 More specifically, Finnis argues that religion is a part of our human good that law must accommodate. This 
has attracted criticism from secularists that argue  law and religion lack the close link which Finnis endorses.   
where they better incorporate principles such as publicity and the rejection of retrospective 
legislation.  
Kant, Finnis and Fuller represent important innovations of the natural law tradition. Each 
shares certain features in common. For example, all three argue that law can and should be 
assessed through moral criteria to determine how ‘just’, or ‘lawful’, law is. These criteria 
have relevance for every individual across diverse societies. A further, and crucial, shared 
perspective for our later discussion of Seth’s theory is this: where moral standards may be 
applied and enforced in law, each claims that they should be. Kant’s moral law informs 
positive law where such positive law might be enforceable. Finnis’s forms of the human good 
should find expression in our legal system and ought to do so where they can do so. Fuller’s 
‘internal morality of law’ is a morality that should be incorporated into the law at every point. 
This brief critical survey of the natural law tradition is not meant to be comprehensive. 
Instead, I have drawn attention to certain features common to leading representatives of this 
tradition. These features include the central importance of the distinction between law and 
just law, the universal character of the moral standards used to make this assessment and that 
where moral standards may be applied and enforced in positive law then they should be. 
Whilst the natural law tradition is a broad tent encompassing a diversity of views, these 
features are characteristic for many of the views of its more famous proponents. My task has 
been to identify them rather than offer some defence. 
Seth on Natural Law 
James Seth was not primarily a legal theorist, but a moral philosopher. Nonetheless, we are 
able to discern a coherent position about law and legal theory in his work, such as in his 
major treatise A Study of Ethical Principles (1898). Seth’s views are distinctive from other 
British Idealists. He defends ‘an ethics of personality’ he calls ‘eudaemonism’ that attempts 
to unify sensibility with reason (1898: 82, 186, 188-240; see 1926:165-66). Seth argues that 
our emotions and reason need not remain in conflict, but rather the latter should govern the 
former not unlike Plato’s famous charioteer in the Phaedrus (1997: 246a-254e). Reason has a 
special priority, but it is only one part of Seth’s moral philosophy (Seth 1898: 123). Adopting 
Kant’s phrasing, Seth argues ‘that if reason without feeling is empty, feeling without reason 
is blind’ (1898: 122). He also claims that ‘a merely rational life, excluding sensibility, is as 
impossible for man as a life of mere sensibility without reason’ (1898: 147). Together, reason 
and sensibility contribute to ‘the complete self or personality of the individual’ (1898: 213, 
see 242).  For Seth, ‘character is nature disciplined’: ‘sensibility needs the education of 
reason, before it is capable of government; it must itself be governed, before it is fitted to 
govern’ (1898: 241, 242). 
Seth offers us a liberal theory about individual rights and the relation between law and 
morality must be understood within this context. Political society exists for the individual and 
his or her pursuit of virtue.
5
 Seth argues: 
Society exists for the individual, it is the mechanism of his personal life. All social 
progress consists in the perfecting of this mechanism, to the end that the moral 
individual may have more justice and freer play in the working out of his own 
individual destiny . . . Social organisation is never an end in itself, it is always a 
means to the attainment of individual perfection (1898: 271-72).
6
 
The State must be regarded as a means, not as in itself an end. The State exists for the 
sake of the person, not the person for the sake of the State. The ethical unit is the 
person; and the mission of the State is not to supersede the person, but to aid him in 
the development of his personality—to give him room and opportunity. It exists for 
him, not he for it; it is his sphere, the medium of his moral life . . . the true function of 
the State is to mediate and fulfil the personal life of the citizen (1898: 287-88, see 
303). 
We must then consider how this goal might be best achieved in clarifying his views on law. 
One important consideration is that, for Seth, part of the moral goodness in choosing to do a 
morally good action is found in the free choice to decide for ourselves.
7
 Moral progress is 
earned through a ‘struggle . . . not with evil in general, or with nature in the abstract’, but 
rather ‘the task is always one of self-conquest’ (1898: 243). Seth argues that ‘the ethical value 
of life, both in its length and in its breadth, in the duration and in the wealth of its activities, is 
to a considerable extent within our own power’ (1898: 250). For Seth, ‘the primary function 
of the State is not to make its citizens good’ (1926: 172). He adds: ‘Not even God can make a 
man good. Goodness, by its very nature, must be the achievement of the individual: each 
must work out his own salvation’ (1898: 272). This sets important limits on legitimate state 
interference. Not only is the state unable to make men moral, any attempt is likely to be self-
defeating.
8
 For Seth, ‘the moral life is essentially a personal life; in this sense all morality is 
private’ (1898: 273).9 
This fact highlights a key distinction in Seth’s understanding of the relation between law and 
morality. We ought not use law to ensure individuals perform morally approved actions 
because the morality of our actions requires free choice and, preferably, without the threat of 
                                                          
5
 ‘The end of life is an ideal of character, to be realised by the individual, and his attitude to it is one of 
obligations or duty to realise it. It is not something to be got or to be done, but to be or to become. It is to be 
sought not without, but within; it is the man himself, in that true or essential nature’ (Seth 1898: 16).  
6
 Seth’s constant focus on the importance of the individual may derive from his deeply held religious beliefs: ‘It 
is of the essence of Protestantism to reject all external authority, and to affirm the right of the individual to 
judge for himself in moral as well as in intellectual matters’ (1926: 13). 
7
 ‘it is the deepest self of humanity that makes its constant claim upon the individual man, and demands its 
realisation’ (Seth 1898: 215). 
8
 ‘It is forgotten that men cannot be made moral by Act of Parliament, that men cannot be made moral at all’ 
(Seth 1898: 337). 
9
 ‘The most perfect State will be that in which there is least repression, and most encouragement and 
development, of the free life of a full individuality in all the citizens’ (Seth 1898: 304). 
state sanction. We have a right to choose wrong in order to give value to our choosing good. 
The law should not be designed to ensure no one acts wrongly, but rather to better enable 
individuals to live more virtuously (see 1898: 206, 269). Righteousness is a product of moral 
character and not the object of legislation (see 1926: 62).  
There are clear limits on what wrongs may be tolerated. Seth argues that the appropriate 
limits are individual rights. Our rights are a core part of each person’s good. Seth insists 
repeatedly that the only good worth its name is the good of individuals: ‘the person, not 
society, is the ultimate ethical unit and reality’ (1898: 18, see 204-5, 211). The ‘protection of 
the fundamental rights of the individual’ is the paramount goal for the state (Seth 1926: 172).  
An essential part of this good is the rights that individuals enjoy and these command legal 
protection.
10
 Individual rights, for Seth, form an essential moral justification for the law. 
Legal systems may be assessed on their success at securing the maintenance and protection of 
individual rights. Legal systems have greater moral justification as ethical institutions where 
this is guaranteed (see Seth 1926: 177). Seth claims it is a mistake to hold the view of law ‘as 
mere obedience to a code of rules or precepts—to think of morality as something to do (or 
not to do) rather than as something to be or to become’ (1898: 16; see Seth 1926: 156; Taylor 
1896: 48).
11
 He rejects this ‘mechanical’ view about law and legal obligations in favour of the 
view that law must help facilitate individual ‘self-realisation’ and ‘self-fulfilment’ (1898: 
198; see Seth 1926: 166, 168-69).
12
 In fact, our self-realisation is our ‘ultimate and 
inalienable human right’ (1898: 423). Seth claims that ‘we ought not to be always trying to 
“do good”; the first requisite for doing good is to be good’ (1898: 253).  
Crimes are not merely public wrongs, but infringement of rights; crimes are rights violations 
that invite the possibility of punishment. Any punishment must be justified and distributed 
according to whether it helps to secure the rights of individuals, including the rights of the 
criminal (1905: 306). If the wrong of crime is the violation of rights, then punishment cannot 
be justified where it renders rights less secure or stable. Instead, punishment must contribute 
to rights protection. To this end, Seth argues that punishment aims at a restoration of rights 
that may refer to multiple penal principles as part of what I have called the ‘unified theory of 
punishment’ (Brooks 2010, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b). Punishment must be deserved, contribute 
to crime reduction and help facilitate criminal rehabilitation (1898: 315-16; see 1926: 178-
79). These different penal goals may be coherently brought together without conflict because 
they serve the larger goal of securing the protection of individual rights (see 1898: 305). Seth 
argues that ‘the total conception of punishment may contain various elements indissolubly 
united’ (1892: 237). 
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  ‘The right of the State to coerce the individual . . . is grounded in the fact that it exists for the sake of the 
interests of personality’ (Seth 1898: 293). 
11
 Seth later argues: ‘The living throbbing experience of the moral man—remorse and retribution, approbation 
and reward, all the grief and humiliation of his life, all its joy and exaltation—imply a deep and ineradicable 
conviction that his destiny, if partly shaped for him by a power beyond himself, is yet, in its grand outline, in 
his own hands, to make it or mar it, as he will’ (1898: 363). 
12
 Seth draws a distinction between being a mere individual and becoming a person, or ‘total self’ (1898: 199-
200). 
Seth argues that the proportionality of punishment is set not in terms of the gravity of moral 
wrongness, but the centrality of the right violated within the wider legal context. The idea is 
that justified laws each serve to protect rights and secure individual liberty (1898: 285). Seth 
argues: 
This view of the object gives the true measure of its amount. This is found not in the 
amount of moral depravity which the crime reveals, but in the importance of the right 
violated, relatively to the system of rights of which it forms a part . . . The measure of 
the punishment is, in short, the measure of social necessity; and this measure is a 
changing one (1916: 311).
13
 
Some rights may require greater protection than others. For example, the right to life may 
require greater protection than a right to private property because the former is necessary for 
the enjoyment of other rights. We punish crimes in proportion to the importance of the right 
violated. This measure may fluctuate over time so that what is criminalized and its 
importance relative to other possible infringements of rights may change.
14
 For Seth, ‘the 
ideal State is never reached’ and cannot be achieved (1898: 216). 
This developmental view about the relation between law and morality coheres with an 
Aristotelian strand of the natural law tradition.
15
 This strand defends a view about legal 
development and Seth’s theory of law is best characterized as falling within this strand of the 
tradition. Of course, Seth arrives at this position for different reasons than Aristotle although 
both defend ideas about the importance of self-realisation and the need for law to avoid 
becoming a hindrance of this project.
16
 Seth’s views are distinctive for their clear focus on the 
individual and how best to enable her to secure her self-realisation where law serves as one 
means amongst others, including civic associations. While Seth’s natural law theory is very 
different from other canonical figures in the tradition, such as Kant, Finnis or Fuller, Seth 
nonetheless represents a distinctive and more attractive alternative that endorses a more 
narrow view about the relation between law and morality along with a clear focus on 
individual liberty.
17
 
Seth’s Contribution 
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 This passage was added after the publication of the 3
rd
 edition. This is part of a two page addition from the 
eighth edition of A Study of Ethical Principles that further clarifies Seth’s views about punishment. His 
comments are additions and there are no revisions of his previous remarks in earlier editions. His brother, 
Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, says of the latter amendments to A Study of Ethical Principles that ‘certain 
changes were introduced from time to time in successive editions—changes of emphasis for the most part—as 
a result of the author’s continuous reflection on the subject-matter. But in all the essentials of its standpoints 
and method, the book, now in its sixteenth edition, has remained substantially the same’ with the possible 
exception of a new chapter on ‘Moral Progress’ added in the third edition (1926: xxiv). 
14
 Seth argues that law and morality might never perfectly cohere, in part, because ‘a moral law is that which 
ought to be, but perhaps never strictly is’: it is ‘the eternal claim of the ideal upon the actual’ (1898: 15, 139). 
15
 Many thanks to [deleted] for pushing me to clarify this important aspect of Seth’s views. 
16
 See Finnis (2002) on Aristotle’s understanding of natural law. 
17
 Seth’s views on law are also distinctive from the broader Hegelian tradition in important respects (Brooks 
2007). 
Seth’s contribution to natural law theory has many attractions. The first is the way in which it 
attempts to situate the relation between law and morality. Seth does not argue or claim that 
law and morality must aspire to perfect unity.
18
 Nor does he argue that we should criminalize 
any immorality we could enforce. He does not begin with a view about what is wrong and 
then move to develop a view about criminalization. Instead, he begins from the importance of 
the individual and the need for the protection of individual rights. Law is concerned with the 
maintenance and protection of individual rights, a position that is sensitive to changing social 
contexts and historical transformation. Seth argues that the state is a ‘custodian’ of our rights: 
‘Its function is to recognise, to establish, and to formulate them in law; its law is only a 
version of moral law’ (1898: 299).  
A second attraction of Seth’s theory is its view about legal moralism. The latter is an 
important perspective on criminalization endorsed by most natural lawyers. The view is that 
the law should aim to prohibit certain immoral conduct where criminality overlaps with 
immorality and perhaps even wickedness. For example, Kant argues that murder should be 
criminalized and punished severely because it is no mere moral wrong, but an instantiation of 
inner wickedness (1996: 106-7). 
Standard criticisms of legal moralism often appeal to the mala in se versus mala prohibita 
distinction (Brooks 2012a: 6-10, 111). Mala in se crimes are wrongs independent of their 
illegality, or sometimes explained as public wrongs we should expect any attractive legal 
system to criminalize. Examples may include crimes such as murder, theft and child sex 
offences. Mala prohibita crimes are wrongs because declared illegal by the state. Common 
examples include drug offences, prostitution and traffic offences. Critics of legal moralism 
argue that their view is flawed because it cannot account for mala prohibita crimes. If 
criminality is linked with immorality, then legal moralists have a problem where not all 
crimes we would want to include as criminal may be accounted for. 
Legal moralists appeal to one of two responses . The first response is to argue for 
decriminalization of mala prohibita crimes. So some might respond that drug offences are not 
mala in se crimes, but this is only a problem for legal moralism if legal moralists wanted to 
punish drug offences. One escape is to support the decriminalization of drug offences to 
avoid this problem. This leaves other problematic cases, such as traffic offences, less easily 
avoided and which point to a second response legal moralists offer. This is to deny there is 
any such distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes at all (Duff 2000: 67, 87-
88; Duff 2006: 90-91). The argument is that the criminal law is inherently normative in 
setting out prohibited conduct and as such it must secure some degree of moral justification. 
So it is a mistake to say that even traffic offences are amoral because their justification arises 
from some deeper, foundational normative source such as the agreed procedures to determine 
laws. The problem here is that if all laws share the same source of justification, then this 
renders unclear how we might determine the relative wrongness of each crime from another 
(Brooks 2012a: 111-14). If all crimes possess equal normative justification, then what might 
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 ‘The primary function of the State is not to make its citizens good: its law and order are not intended to 
coincide with the moral law and order’ (Seth 1926: 172). 
justify the distribution of different punishments on account of normative considerations? 
Instead of claiming that we look to each individual potential crime and consider its possible 
immorality, we consider the broader system and ask whether it is consistent with some moral 
standard. Yet, the morality of the wider system may be a separate consideration from the 
morality of practices falling under this system.  
Seth’s theory of natural law helps us avoid these problems.19 Law is about the maintenance 
and protection of rights whatever else it may be. Criminalization is justified where crimes 
may violate rights. Furthermore, some crimes should be punished more than others because 
of the relative importance of the right violated. Seth is able to usefully address the first set of 
worries concerning the mala in se and mala prohbita distinction in that the only crimes his 
theory is addressing are crimes that violate rights. There should be no problem about the 
potential for punishing crimes that do not violate rights because no such potential may exist. 
So he need not offer a retreat by way of decriminalization to avoid this criticism about legal 
moralism because he offers a more narrow understanding of criminalization through rights 
protection. Crimes are not only wrongs; they are rights violations.  
Seth may also overcome the second challenge where some legal moralists have tried to deny 
mala prohibita crimes in order to address the problem that if such crimes exist then it 
undermines legal moralism. This category is denied by arguing that all crimes share the same 
justification, but this leaves open the problem of how to determine proportionality where each 
crime is justified on the same basis. Seth’s theory offers a more convincing response. He can 
claim that all illegality satisfies the moral standard of being a violation of rights: all crimes 
are public wrongs in a more narrow sense than other legal moralist views, but without 
reducing them to mala in se which includes the idea of wrongness independent of legal 
recognition. Furthermore, Seth’s justification of criminalization in terms of rights violations 
is set within a wider context where law serves the end of the maintenance and protection of 
individual rights (see 1898: 315). So he is able to account for proportionality in criminal 
seriousness and punishment in ways that other legal moralists cannot. 
Conclusion 
James Seth was not a lawyer or legal philosopher and yet his work offers a valuable 
contribution to legal thought more than a century later. Seth’s legal theory is an illuminating 
alternative account within the natural law tradition that prioritizes individual rights and 
respect for moral choice. His views contribute to a more compelling view about punishment 
and its justification as a unified theory with the aim of the restoration of individual rights. 
Seth also defends a more persuasive alternative understanding of legal moralism that 
overcomes problems that continue to confound legal moralists today. 
Perhaps it is then surprising to recall the general obscurity that Seth’s work has endured and 
the overall neglect by legal philosophers about the contributions British Idealists offer us 
today. My ambition is that this piece may help inspire others to re-examine British Idealism 
more generally and James Seth’s work in particular for the real contributions to contemporary 
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 Seth is alive to the need ‘to avoid moral scepticism’ in his defence of a natural law theory (1898: 120). 
debates they continue to offer. We have witnessed a renaissance of interest in British Idealists 
on metaphysics and political philosophy. It may be time for a new wave regarding their work 
in law and legal theory next.
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